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Abstract	This	 chapter	 fundamentally	 challenges	 the	 received	 wisdom	 of	 the	‘digital	 age’	 and	 music,	 which	 is	 technologically	 reductive	 and	generalized.	 Instead	 I	 argue	 for	 the	 need	 to	 attend	 to	 the	 situated	nature	of	the	practices	that	constitute	music.	In	so	doing	I	bring	back	the	 material	 to	 ‘digital	 discourse’,	 and	 reconnect	 with	 space	 and	society.	 	 In	 so	 doing	 I	 break	 the	 binary	 divide	 of	 the	 digital	 and	material	and	remake	it	as	a	hybrid.	The	structure	of	the	chapter	is	as	follows:	 I	 @irst	 introduce	 the	 idea	 of	 copyright	 and	 ownership	 in	music:	 what	 it	 is,	 what	 can	 be	 owned,	 and	 how	 local	 institutions	shape	it.	In	the	second	and	third	parts	I	elaborate	the	issues	and	some	practical	 consequences	 through	 exploration	 of	 @irst	 ownership,	 and	second,	 trade.	 I	 explore	 these	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 the	 two	 types	 of	“rights”	 in	music:	moral	 and	mechanical.	 I	 further	 show	 how	 these	are	interwoven,	and	embedded	in	space.	
Keywords:	digitization,	cultural	 labour	 ,copyright,	material	practice,	intellectual	 property	 rights,	 immaterial	 labour,	 affect,	 moral	 rights,	mechanical	rights,	scale,	situated	practices,	digital	age,	legality,	place,	space	
1.	Introduction	This	chapter	is	concerned	with	copyright	and	music.	Its	stress	on	the	material	 geographies	 and	 practice	 challenges	 the	 norms	 of	 debate	that	 have	 been	 dominated	 by	 concern	with	 the	 immaterial	 and	 the	virtual.	The	chapter	argues	 that	such	conceptual	and	practical	 focus	on	de-materialization	has	obscured,	or	distracted,	analyses	to	such	an	extent	 that	 it	 has	 rendered	 invisible	 the	 geographical.	 Not	surprisingly	debates	have	been	dazzled	by	 technological	changes,	 to	the	extent	 that	 they	have	–	erroneously	–	displaced	other	 concerns.	The	premature	announcement	of	the	“death	of	distance”	being	a	case	
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in	point.	The	chapter	argues	for	the	need	to	turn	our	attention	on	the	social	 and	 spatial	 embedding	 of	 musical	 practice	 if	 we	 are	 to	 fully	comprehend	 its	 emergent	 forms	 in	 the	 “digital	 age.”	This	 chapter	 is	positioned	 against	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 ‘digital	 age	 :	 a	 term	 that	 is	associated	with	teleological	theories	of	development.	Moreover,	it	is	a	term	 that	 has	 deep	 roots	 in	 the	 writings	 of	 conservative	 futurists	(Bell	1973,	Tof@ler	1980),	and	much	of	the	contemporary	‘technology	commentariat’	spun	out	from	Wired	magazine	(Kelly	1998).	A	telling	critical	exposition	of	such	writing	can	be	found	in	the	exploration	of	the	‘Californian	Ideology’.(Barbrook	and	Cameron	1995).		Copyright	 and	music	 are	 often	 used	 in	 the	 same	 sentence,	 and	 the	issue	 of	 piracy	 and	 downloading	 has	 become	 the	 stuff	 of	 moral	panics.	 By	 focusing	 on	 consumption	 and	 distribution,	 and	 the	(disembodied)	 digital,	 we	 have	 become	 disconnected	 from	 the	materiality	of	musical	production.	Debates	about	the	consumption	of	music,	 where	 focus	 is	 on	 an	 exclusive	 concern	 with	 the	 online	purchase	and	distribution	of	music,		are	a	legitimate	concern,	but	not	when	they	lead	to	the	exclusion	of	the	production	of	music.	We	have	accepted	 the	 organizational	 erasure	 of	 intermediaries,	 and	 the	idealization	of	a	peer-to-peer	world,	as	if	it	were	a	naïve	neo-classical	economic	textbook.	A	further	“invisibility”	in	neo-classical	economics	and	debates	 about	 the	digital	 age	 concerns	 spaces,	 institutions,	 and	people.	A	 related	 neglect	 concerns	work	 on	 the	 labour	 and	 organization	 of	music	making,	and	the	dynamics	of	performance	and	audiences.	The	framing	 of	 the	 debate	 in	 contemporary	 normative	 literature	 thus	immediately	 pre-presents	 this	 second	 position	 which	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 material	 and	 affective	 as	 analogue,	 Luddite,	 or	 backward	looking .	 To	 be	 sure,	 I	 want	 to	 support	 a	 different	 perspective	 that	1acknowledges	labour	in	the	digital	age;	but	I	will	argue	that	this	can	only	be	successfully	achieved	by	re-conceptualizing	the	two	positions	as	 joined	 and	 interwoven.	 This	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 connect	 the	 two	dimensions	(the	social	and	material	,	and	the	digital	and	immaterial)	in	 a	 novel	 manner:	 a	 way	 that	 it	 is	 not	 simply	 additive,	 but	 is	transformative	 of	 both	 sides.	 The	 key	 element	 is	 how	 we	conceptualize	 copyright	 (Kretschmer	 and	 Pratt	 2009).	 Normative	
	Indications	of	other	silencing	has	been	evidenced	in	the	re-examination	of	the	1role	of	‘craft	and	graft’	in	cultural	work	Sennett,	R.	(2008).	The	craftsman.	New	Haven,	Yale	University	Press.	And	the	vast	literature	on	the		‘maker	movement‘	Dougherty,	D.	(2012).	"The	maker	movement."	innovations	7(3):	11-14.
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views,	if	they	acknowledge	it	at	all,	view	copyright	as	an	autonomous,	“bolt	on,”	characteristic	of	music;	I	will	argue	that	it	is	better	seen	as	a	relational	feature,	one	that	re-constitutes	both	music	and	place.	Polarized	 debates	 about	 copyright	 tend	 to	 @lounder	 on	 atomistic	idealizations	of	the	legal	relations	of	music.	First,	via	a	concern	with	the	mechanisms	and	business	models	presumed	by	a	particular	legal	construct.	 Second,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 blame	 attributed	 to	 individuals	associated	 with	 moral	 failure 	 (usually	 characterized	 by	 the	 youth,	2and	those	residing	in	the	Global	South).	Both	positions	presume	that	copyright	 is	 universal	 and	 indisputable:	 a	position	 that	 this	 chapter	contests.	It	is	this	underlying	assumption	that	the	chapter	contests.	In	short	I	argue	that	copyright	is	relational,	taking	its	meaning	from	its	context	(social,	economic	and	spatial):	that	is,	opposed	to	an	absolute	position	 that	 excludes	 context.	 Conceptualized	 thus	we	 re-open	 the	possibility	 of	 geographies	 of	 copyright	 and	 musical	 practice	 which	have	recently	been	severed.	Music	practices	that	we	may	observe	take	place	 in,	 and	 are	 constituted	 by,	 a	 legal	 framework ,	 such	 that	 we	3assume	them	to	be	natural.	These	points	is	analogous	to	driving	a	car	on	 a	 road,	 it	 not	 “natural,”	 or	 always	 correct,	 to	 drive	 on	 either	 the	right	or	 the	 left,	but	 is	a	norm	constituted	by	particular	 legal	codes.	Under	 such	 codes,	 and	 practices,	 certain	 rights	 (let	 alone	 security)	are	created	for	those	who	operate	in	compliance	with	them.		I	argue	 that	 laws	constitute	 the	practices,	not	simply	regulate	 them.	The	 law	is	not	an	 idle	bystander,	but	an	active	participant	 it	shapes,	and	 is	shaped	by,	history	and	social	norms.	 In	 this	chapter	 I	seek	to	admit	 a	 place	 for	 the	 (otherwise	 excluded)	 spatial	 and	 temporal	changes	in	music	making,	their	practices	and	technologies,	as	well	as	the	 international	 @lows.	 In	 their	 different	 ways,	 which	 allows	 us	 to	explore	 how	 they	 generate	 the	 geographies	 of	 music	 as	conceptualized	in	this	chapter.	They	are	not	separate	from	the	digital	they	 are	 intimately	 bound	 up	 with	 it.	 A	 critical	 element	 is	 the	territorial	variation	of	 legal	 jurisdictions;	 in	particular	 the	degree	to	
	Copyright	transgressions	are	subject	to	moral	sanction:	they	are	2‘bad’	:’copyright	is	theft’.	When	combined	with	developmentalist	discourse	that	constitute	a	story	of	‘moral	failure’	of	whole	peoples;	constructed	as	a	disrespect	for	an	atomized	and	commoditized	notion	of	ownership.		Legal	frameworks,	and	social	institutions,	are	of	course	embedded	in	places	and	3practices.
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which	laws	on	the	statute	books	in	any	place	are	implemented .	This	4analytic	space	I	argue,	opens	up	a	rich	empirical	@ield	of	copyright	in	and	 across	 different	 places,	 and	 the	 organizational	 and	 political	mechanisms,	and	spatial	con@igurations	of	music.	It	is	this	that	I	argue	is	 a	 better	 framework	 for	 analysis,	 one	 that	 sees	 an	 intimate	 and	recursive	relationship	between	people,	place	and	social	and	economic	institutions.	In	short,	an	approach	that	brings	the	digital	age	back	to	earth:	speci@ic	times,	places	and	practices.	The	structure	of	the	chapter	is	as	follows:	I	@irst	introduce	the	idea	of	copyright	and	ownership	in	music:	what	it	is,	what	can	be	owned,	and	how	 local	 institutions	 shape	 it.	 In	 the	 second	 and	 third	 parts	 I	elaborate	 the	 issues	 and	 some	 practical	 consequences	 through	exploration	 of	 @irst	 ownership,	 and	 second,	 trade.	 I	 explore	 these	through	 the	 lens	 of	 the	 two	 types	 of	 “rights”	 in	 music:	 moral	 and	mechanical.	I	further	show	how	these	are	interwoven,	and	embedded	in	space.	
2.	Basics:	What	do	we	own?	
De-materialization	We	often	take	the	idea	of	ownership	for	granted,	it	is	banal;	it	is	only	contested	 if	 we	 have	 an	 obvious	 transgression:	 a	 theft.	 Such	 a	demonstration	 of	 proof	 is	 tricky	 enough	with	 a	material	 object,	 let	alone	 an	 immaterial	 one.	 In	 such	 a	 case	how	do	you	prove	 that	 the	object	“stolen”	is	yours?	What	is	it	that	you	actually	“own”?	That	has	been	 in	 your	 possession;	 you	 have	 the	 receipt	 maybe?	We	 tend	 to	think	 of	 the	 ownership	 of	music	 in	 this	way	 eliding	 the	 intellectual	and	material	dimensions	of	 the	“thing.”	Recent	debates	about	piracy	echo	such	a	simple	good-bad	distinction,	one	where	there	is	a	natural	right	 or	wrong.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 section	 is	 to	 unsettle	 this	 binary	 of	right	and	wrong,	or	at	least	its	apparently	normative	values.	The	aim	is	to	highlight	a	new	dimension	to	the	legal	geographies	of	music	that	are	produced	 through	 the	operation	of	 copyright	 regimes,	 and	 their	concomitant	concepts	of	property	rights.	A	necessary	 @irst	step	 is	 to	acknowledge	the	multiple	claims	of	legal	rights	concerning	music.	
	This	echoes	a	point	that	Sassen.	Sassen,	S.	(2013).	Losing	control?:	sovereignty	4in	the	age	of	globalization,	Columbia	University	Press.	makes	with	respect	to	sovereignty	and	globalization:	it	is	always	local	and	requires	local	legal	decisions
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In	the	last	decade	we	have	witnessed	one	round	of	debates	about	the	“death	of	geography”	and	digitisation.	Considered	analysis	has	shown	this	to	be	a	 fallacious	and	sloppy	argument	concerned	with	abstract	and	 idealized	 possibilities,	 divorced	 from	 material	 practices	 in	 the	world	 (Cairncross	 1998).	 Beyond	 a	 knee-jerk	 corrective	 we	 can	sketch	 a	 new	 line	 of	 debate	 that	 offers	 a	 more	 hybrid	 position,	 as	opposed	 to	 a	 polarized	 viewpoint.	 The	 particular	 focus	 of	 many	commentators,	 in	 part	 that	 which	 other	 authors	 in	 this	 book	 are	responding	 to,	 is	 the	 dematerialization	 of	 production	 and	consumption:	 co-authors	 are	 seeking	 to	 re-ground	 these	 concerns	literately	and	@iguratively	(See	chapters	x,	x	and	x).	My	contribution	is	complementary,	 but	 slightly	 different:	 it	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 notion	 of	the	 “rights”	 of	music,	who	 can	 use	 them	 and	 in	which	 forms.	More	generally	I	want	to	show	that	the	“legal”	is	not	just	a	context,	but	also	an	active	shaper	of	music	production	and	its	modes	of	consumption;	and,	 the	means	 of	 production	 of	 its	 distinct	 geographies.	 It	 is	 these	situated	socio-economic-legal	conditions	that	de@ine	and	@ix	the	local	forms	of		‘digital’	practice	(and	its	emergent	forms)	
Intellectual	and	Material	rights	Many	people	have	rightly	highlighted	the	challenge	of	digitization	to	many	practices,	especially	those	of	music.	When	they	do	so,	it	is	often	shorthand	for	new	business	models,	such	as	the	“long	tail”,	and	new	means	 of	 communication	 instantiated	 in	 the	 immaterial	 software	down	load	versus	the	physical	distribution	of	the	material	product	of	record	 or	 a	 CD	 (Wikström	2009).	What	 is	 less	 discussed	 is	 the	 fact	that	 we	 are	 not	 dealing	 with	 material	 things,	 but	 with	 electrical	impulses	and	that	the	“rights”	associated	are	intellectual	as	well	as,	or	instead	of	material	 ones.	Moreover,	we	 are	 codifying	who	and	what	can	be	owned,	or	who	 is	deemed	 responsible	 for	 a	 creative	act.	 For	example,	is	sampling	a	drum	beat	a	creative	act,	different	from	that	of	the	 original	 drummer?	Who	 should	 have	 the	 rights	 to	 the	 sample?	And	how	should	the	income	be	divided?	Much	of	our	common	sense	and	 everyday	 practice	 is	 constructed	 around	 “things”;	 we	 have	common	codes	for	referring	to	them	(length	of	our	possession;	or,	we	have	 a	 receipt),	 locating	 them	 and	 transacting	 them.	 Even	 then,	we	know	 that	 they	 can	be	 the	 source	of	 legal	dispute	 (for	 example,	did	the	 seller	 own	 the	 object	 that	 we	 purchased).	 The	 problem	 is	 that	when	we	 discuss	 the	 digital	 we	 commonly	 use	 the	 same	 analogies.	But,	the	analogy	should	be	reversed.	What	we	miss	is	the	fact	that	the	material	 object	 –	 by	 its	 brute	 physicality	 –	 stands	 in	 for	 the	 “legal”	thing.	 Traditionally	we	have	 referred	 to	 the	 vinyl	 disc	 or	 CD,	 as	 the	
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‘carrier’	of	the	rights;	however,	in	legal	terms	the	MP3	is	also	a	carrier.	The	rights	question	does	not	change,	although	apparently	the	carrier	has	‘dematerialised’.	Here	we	are	in	danger	of	a	philosophical	debate	about	 “thing-ness”.	 But	 it	 can	 be	 appreciated	 that	 if	 you	 take	 the	physical	object	out	of	the	equation	all	 that	you	have	are	the	rules	of	“ownership,”	in	this	chapter	what	we	refer	to	as	intellectual	property	(again,	the	very	language	refers	us	back	to	a	physical	analogue).	Why	does	all	of	this	matter?	Let’s	take	the	example	of	a	CD	(for	those	old	enough	to	remember	them;	or	substitute	any	carrier	of	the	IP,	or	any	 service	 to	distribute	 it).	 I	 use	 the	CD	as	 example	as	 it's	 the	 last	direct	physical	transaction	of	music	that	we	have.	It	this	sense	we	use	the	material	concepts	and	translate	them	to	the	real	of	the	digital	and	something	goes	awry.	In	the	case	of	a	CD	it	is	bought	in	a	shop,	then	legally	you	own	it;	don’t	you?	You	may	be	surprised	what	you	actually	own:	some	plastic	and	paper.	The	 information	encoded	on	the	CD	is	protected,	and	you	have	purchased	a	right	to	use	it,	you	do	not	own	it.	Likewise	with	an	MP3	download,	or	a	streamed	@ile:	even	though	its	digital	you	don’t	own	the	IP.	The	right	to	use	it	(the	IP)	is	delimited	by	strict	conditions	such	as	not	playing	 it	 to	other	people	(in	whatever	media),	and	not	copying	it	(that	would	even	include	singing	it),	only	to	play	it	on	speci@ic	machinery,	and	in	some	cases	only	in	particular	legal	 territories.	 For	 this	 right	 you	have	paid	 a	 fee,	 or	 a	 rent.	 It	 is	 a	‘right’	that	the	originator	can	withdraw	at	any	time.	It	is	immediately	apparent	that	the	slippage	between	legal	nicety	and	common	practice	creates	a	norm	of	technical	“law	breaking.”	This	 might	 be	 troubling,	 or	 confusing,	 but	 does	 it	 really	 matter?	 I	want	to	show	that	it	matters	for	the	geography	of	music,	and	how	we	conceive	it.	However,	thus	far	I	have	only	considered	the	rights	to	use	or	trade	the	music:	who	owns	it,	and	who	created	it?	For	example,	it	is	 perfectly	 possible	 and	 indeed	 likely,	 that	 the	 rights	 to	 play,	 or	reproduce,	a	piece	of	music	are	owned	by	person	A	in	country	1,	and	person	B	in	country	2.	There’s	an	apparent	paradox!	Can	two	people	own	the	same	thing:	yes,	but	separated	by	territory.	As	I	will	explain	this	 will	 take	 us	 in	 other	 apparently	 mind-boggling	 directions.	However,	 it	 lies	 at	 the	 core	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	 living	 and	working	musician,	how	you	make	a	living	from	your	composition.	My	core	 point	 will	 be	 to	 show	 that	 the	 ownership	 question	 is	 not	obvious;	in	fact	it	is	a	socially	situated	and	negotiated	thing.	Related,	these	 negotiations	 are	 embedded	 in	 particular	 territorial	 legal	systems,	 which	 are	 different.	 So,	 there	 is	 an	 obvious	 geography	 of	copyright.	Moreover,	 the	 trade	 or	 exchange	 between	 one	 system	 or	
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territory	and	another	can	 lead	to	distinct	 inequalities.	Simply,	 if	you	take	 your	 music	 into	 another	 legal	 jurisdiction	 you	 may	 have	 no	rights	to	use	it.	By	using	 the	example	of	what	we	might	 “own”	of	a	CD	 I	hope	 that	 I	have	 begun	 to	 problematize	 ownership	 and	 the	 material.	 We	naturally	tend	to	assume	that	ownership	is	a	totalizing	and	universal	fact:	both	in	terms	of	the	“ownership”	and	the	“thing.”	As	the	CD	(or	any	other	carrier)	example	shows	we	are	in	fact	offered	rights	of	use	only,	these	rights	actually	shape	the	“thing”	the	music	on	the	CD,	what	it	is	and	what	we	can	do	with	it	(for	example,	different	versions	of	the	same	album,	or	different	albums,	released	in	various	countries).	The	common	 misunderstanding	 of	 ownership	 leads	 us	 down	 the	 false	path	of	thinking	that	we	can	choose	what	we	do	with	any	object	that	we	own;	moreover,	if	we	separate	the	thing	from	the	material	that	we	have	somehow	liberated	it.	As	some	digital	libertarians	have	it:	“data	wants	to	be	free.”	They	 	are,	in	other	words,	constructing	data/music	as	independent	and	somehow	outside	of	control.	This	is	not	what	the	legal	 framework	 suggests.	 Common	 discourse	 about	 music	 rights	tends	to	be	reduced	to	technologies	and	materialities.	This	chapter	is	arguing	 for	 a	more	 subtle	 relationship,	 hence	 the	 unease	with	 such	terms	as	‘the	digital	age’	and	‘digitisation’	when	not	used	in	a	speci@ic	and	situated	manner	The	mechanical	 rights,	 or	what	we	may	normally	 view	as	 the	 trade	and	 consumption	 side,	 are	 important;	 but	 they	 miss	 a	 critical	production	 and	moral	 dimension.	 In	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 chapter	 I	will	 show	 that	 the	 concern	 with	 digitization	 has	 only	 assumed	 to	impact	 on	 this	 aspect	 highlighting	 dis-intermediation,	 and	 the	 ideal	state	 of	 autonomous	producer.	 I	will	 explore	 these	 two	 sides	 of	 the	same	 music	 “coin”	 in	 the	 following	 sections:	 consumption	 and	production.	 In	 both	 cases	 I	 will	 highlight	 the	 fact	 that	 scale	 and	geography	are	constituent	parts	of	music.	 I	will	do	 this	by	adopting	the	legal	codi@ication	of	moral	and	mechanical	rights.	Furthermore,	I	will	 show	 that	 there	 are	 distinct	 temporal,	 scalar,	 and	 spatial	dimensions	to	both.	
3.	Moral	rights	Moral	 rights	 are	 what	 we	 normally	 associate	 with	 the	 “author.”	 In	copyright	 law	 that	 is	 the	 person	 “identi@ied	 as	 the	 author”,	 and	 the	integrity	 of	whose	work	 is	 protected.	 That	 is,	 you	 can”t	 copy	 it	 and	
 7
claim	 it	 for	 yourself,	 you	 can’t	 tamper	 with	 it,	 change	 the	 second	verse	 and	 call	 it	 your	 own.	 An	 author	 can	 claim	 a	 “royalty,”	 a	 rent	essentially,	 on	 others	 using	 the	 work	 identi@ied	 with	 the	 author	(under	 speci@ic	 terms).	 These	 notions	 are	 widespread,	 but	 not	universal,	and	they	are	 interpreted	differently	under	particular	 legal	jurisdictions.	When	you	buy	a	CD,	a	small	percentage,	commonly	5%	of	the	sale	price	is	royalty.	That	may	seem	small,	and	it	is	for	regular	sales;	 but	 in	 a	 temporal	monopoly	 (that	 organizational	 form	 of	 the	charts	creates),	it	can	net	huge	gross	sums.		
Micro-scale	What	is	it	that	the	artist	has	created,	and	can	thus	sell?	And,	how	can	its	ownership	be	designated?	In	the	legal	world	the	term	used	is	“the	work.”	The	work	is	the	music	(and	words)	uniquely	authored	by	the	artist.	If	the	work	is	reproduced	and	distributed	a	second	property,	or	division	of	the	property,	is	created.	That	is	the	work,	and	its	physical	“carrier”	 (the	 recording),	 or	 the	 sheet	music	 (the	mechanical	 rights	discussed	 above).	 Initially	 it	 was	 the	 work	 codi@ied	 as	 notes	 on	 a	stave,	and	sold	as	sheet	music:	 the	author’s	original,	and	 the	copied	item.	On	sale	of	the	sheet	music	the	artist	got	an	income	based	on	the	royalty	–	the	rent	for	the	use	of	the	work	based	upon	sales.	Note	that	this	 is	 different	 to	 the	 regular	 calculation	 of	 the	 margin	 between	production	 costs	 and	 selling	 costs	 of	 a	 regular	 product	 (which,	 to	complicate	matters,	 sheet	music	 is	 simultaneously).	There	were	not	constraints	 on	 the	 reproduction	 of	 the	music	 (today	 that	would	 be	prosecuted	as	 copying:	 even	singing	 “Happy	Birthday”).	Historically,	just	 the	physical	 sheet	music;	 in	 fact	 the	possibility	of	 reproduction	on	 a	 piano	 was	 its	 raison	 d’etre	 and	 the	 business	 model.	 Times	change,	 today	 those	 rights	 are	 retained,	 and	 protected.	 Again,	 this	emphasizes	 the	 situated	 nature	 of	 rights	 and	 how	 they	 affect	 the	conditions	under	which	we	perform	and	 listen	 to	music	 (which	will	be,	necessarily,	place	and	time	speci@ic).	The	slippage	between	common	practice,	or	production	systems,	and	the	 law	 generate	 problems.	 Essentially,	 the	 same	 system	 adopted	from	classical	music	carried	on	into	popular	music.	And	critically,	the	same	 case	 law	 and	 precedent.	 However	 sales	 of	 records,	 and	 the	income,	quickly	exceeded	 that	of	 sheet	music.	Copying	performance	became	 an	 issue	 that	 rights	 holders	 wanted	 to	 protect.	 However,	 a	more	signi@icant	shift	 in	musical	practice	complicated	matters.	From	the	 mid-1960s,	 the	 popular	 music	 performance	 artist	 increasingly	wrote	 their	own	compositions,	however	many	popular	music	artists	
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didn’t	 read	 or	 write	 music.	 This	 created	 two	 challenges.	 First,	collective	 informal	 authorship;	 second	 the	 “work”	 was	 not	transcribed.	An	artist’s	performance	 in	 the	 studio	 is	 either	paid	as	a	one-off	 fee,	and/or	a	small	proportion	of	the	mechanical	rights	(or	reproduction),	not	 the	 moral	 rights	 (authorship;	 which	 normally	 carry	 a	 greater	percentage	revenue	of	royalties).	Band	members	 thus	have	 to	prove	or	 assert	 authorship	 rights	 from	 an	 assumed	 sole	 authorship	 to	instead	 re@lect	 what	 was	 in	 practice	 an	 improvised	 collective	construction.	 Many	 compositions	 emerged	 from	 a	 collective	improvisation	of	 the	band.	A	step	 further	and	we	entered	the	era	of	music	 composition	 in	 the	 studio	where	 there	might	 be	many	more	potential	 “authors”.	Nominal	 authorship	was	 often	 attributed	 to	 the	singer,	 as	 a	 convenience.	 Moreover,	 if	 inspiration	 had	 been	 lifted	(plagiarized)	 from	 another	 song,	 especially	 “folk”	 music	 it	 was	 re-attributed	 to	 the	 current	 performer.	 A	 well-documented	 case	concerns	 Led	 Zeppelin	 who	 many	 “miss-credited”	 themselves	 for	music	 that	 they	 did	 not	write.	 After	 court	 cases	 the	writing	 credits	were	 “adjusted”	 on	 later	 re-issues	 of	 the	 albums,	 and	 revenues	redirected	to	Delta	Blues	songwriters	such	as	Willie	Dixon.	This	was	not	an	exceptional	case	(Vaidhyanathan	2003).	Bently	 (Bently	 2009)	 offers	 another	 dimension	 to	 the	 analysis	 by	showing	how	classically	 trained	ethnomusicologists	 are	often	 called	as	 expert	 witnesses	 in	 court,	 they	 not	 only	 view	 authorship	 in	 a	normative	 fashion,	 but	 also	 reproduce	 the	 “legitimacy”	 of	 non-orchestral	 instruments:	 for	example,	 that	 saxophone	 is	 “ephemeral,”	and	drums	“not	an	element	of	a	musical	work.”	Thus,	Bently	points	to	an	 interpretation	 of	 legal	 cases	 as	 showing	 up	 how	 not	 only	 that	copyright	 does	 not	 work	 (for	 the	 artists),	 but	 also	 that	 it	 does	 not	recognize	the	labor	of	making	music	remaking.	The	 changing	 technologies	 of	 recording	 and	 the	 practices	 that	developed	 around	 them	 further	 complicated	 the	 picture.	 Gander	(Gander	 2010)	 shows	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 studio	 producers	 and	engineers,	 a	 similar	 battle	 has	 taken	 place	 in	 recognition	 of	“authorship”	of	 the	production,	 recording	and	 “the	mix.”	Not	a	 right	generally	 recognized	 in	 the	 law.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 the	 classical	conception	 the	 “technical”	 work	 of	 the	 studio	 is	 further	 from	 the	“creative	 essence”	 and	does	not	 count.	 In	 the	digital	 age	 the	nature	and	history	of	“the	mix”	is	even	more	critical.	Technically	it	is	possible	to	save	every	take,	and	every	mix,	in	the	recording	process.	Producers	
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are	 wary	 of	 providing	 record	 companies	 with	 this	 –	 history.	Producers	are	normally	paid	a	@lat	fee	for	their	services	(instead	of	a	royalty,	 which	 would	 imply	 that	 they	 were	 an	 artist).	 The	 digital	history	potentially	allows	a	“remix”	of	producers’	work;	in	principle	a	challenge	 to	 the	 moral	 rights	 of	 the	 producer	 (if	 they	 were	recognized).	 In	 an	 extra	 legal	 action	 the	 common	 response	 is	 that	“possession”	is	9/10th	of	the	law.	Thus,	it	has	become	usual	for	these	“stems” 	 to	 be	 retained	 by	 the	 producer;	 only	 passing	 on	 the	5processed	 (and	 irreversible)	 @inal	 mix.	 This	 serves	 to	 further	illustrate	 the	 extended	 and	 collective	 nature	 of	 “authorship”	 of	 a	“work”	of	art;	and	the	tensions	between	the	material	and	legal	realms	and	how	they	are	continually	multiplied.	
Macro-scale	There	 is	 a	 basic	 rational	 economic	 requirement	 for	 markets	 to	function:	 that	 payment	 @lows	 from	 the	 purchaser	 to	 producer.	 The	system	 of	 royalties	 is	 a	 rent	 on	 the	 use	 of	 music.	 In	 practice	 the	challenge	is	how	to	collect	the	rent,	and	get	paid.	Generally,	it	is	rolled	up	with	the	selling	price,	and	then	returned	to	a	“collecting	society”	who	 redistributes	 the	 income	 to	 the	 rights	 holders	 based	 upon	 an	audit	of	 sales.	The	 institutional	 requirements	of	an	 the	ef@icient	and	effective	 logging,	 claiming	 and	 distributing	 of	 royalties	 has	 been	 a	challenge	in	the	Global	North,	the	costs	of	institution	building	in	the	Global	 South	 are	 often	 prohibitive.	 These	 institutions	 -	 collecting	societies	-	are	run	and	owned	by	artists.	They	are	costly	and	complex	to	organize.	The	incentive	is	the	“carrot”	a	stream	of	income;	but	this	also	 requires	 an	 effective	 “stick,”	 the	 development	 of	 a	 specialized	legal	 infrastructure	 to	 prosecute	 piracy.	 The	 failure	 of	 these	institutions	 to	 operate,	 and	 the	 articulation	 of	 an	 operational	 legal	framework,	is	a	major	practical	barrier.	Empirically	speaking,	in	much	of	the	world	songwriters	do	not	receive	royalties.	The	speci@ication	of	the	 details	 of	 the	 above	 paragraph	 would	 @ill	 a	 book	 alone,	 and	 it	would	 be	 obsolete	 tomorrow.	 Hence,	 my	 strategy	 here	 of	 avoiding	collapsing	debates	into	technologies;	focusing	instead	of	the	way	that	rights	 are	 mediated	 through	 locally	 and	 temporally	 speci@ic	institutions	and	technological	forms.	This	is	a	conceptualisation	that	can	then	be	applied	empirically	to	cases.		
	Software	code	@iles	produced	by	Pro	Tools,	which	is	the	market-leading	5software	used	for	mixing	music.
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The	consequence	 in	the	Global	South	 is	 that	 the	copyright	system	is	broken	and	few	people	respect	“rights.”	Indeed	one	might	argue	that	it	 is	 not	 “rational”	 to	 do	 so	 under	 such	 conditions.	 Instead	 an	alternative,	 parallel,	market	 develops	 based	 upon	 live	 performance,	where	income	for	artists	can	be	secured	from	the	audience	direct	as	moral	 and	 mechanical	 rights	 may	 be	 practically	 irrelevant	 to	 this	business	 model.	 An	 organizational	 consequence	 is	 that	 musicians	must	over-exploit	themselves	and	use	up	their	creative	stock	of	music	without	fully	exploiting	it.	The	organizational	success	of	the	western	pop	 model	 is	 based	 upon	 monopoly	 pro@its	 from	 a	 “hit,”	 and	 the	restriction	of	releases	of	material	so	that	the	 last	penny	is	extracted	from	 audiences	 before	 a	 subsequent	 release.	 One	 of	 the	 bene@its	 of	the	monopoly	model	 is	 that	–	 for	 the	 few	–	 incomes	are	higher,	and	that	due	to	the	protection	of	rights,	a	continuing	 income	can	be	had	from	music	(usually	via	‘replay’	rights)(Bagdikian	2004).	However,	as	can	 be	 appreciated	 it	 is	 a	 profoundly	 geographical	 question	 as	 to	whose	interest	this	system	works	for.	The	 well-publicized	 “world	 music”	 stars	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 contrary	example,	succeeding	by	breaking	out	of	the	Global	South	system	and	into	 the	 Global	 Northern	 one.	 In	 reality	 they	 are	 using	 a	 parallel	system	 (see	 next	 section).	 Once	 they	 gain	 recognition	 in	 the	North,	they	 secure	 legal	 rights	 (limited	 to	 Northern	 territories),	 and	 form	companies	to	channel	pro@its	 into	banks	based	in	the	North.	 It	 is	 far	from	straightforward	 to	create	a	 @low	of	money	 to	 the	Global	South.	Moreover,	it	is	often	the	case	that	music	by	Southern	artists	recorded	and	released	 in	 the	North,	 is	 legally	not	available	 for	distribution	 in	the	 South.	 If	 Southern	 artists	want	 their	music	 to	 circulate	 in	 their	home	 countries	 they	will	 have	 to	 engineer	 a	 local	 legal	 agreement,	and	battle	to	secure	protection	of	their	rights	(Pratt	2007).	As	noted	above,	in	many	cases	legal	protection	is	regarded	as	irrelevant	by	an	artist.	A	further	point	about	the	relational	legality	of	copyright	touches	on	a	more	 fundamental	point.	The	Northern	copyright	system	assumes	a	singular	ownership	of	authorship.	 In	some	countries	 this	 is	an	alien	concept;	 community	 or	 collective	 rights	 are	 recognized,	 but	 the	concept	 of	 an	 individual	 right	 is	 not	 valid.	 There	 is	 clearly	 a	fundamental	 problem	 of	 resolving	 an	 individualistic	 ontology	 of	copyright,	 with	 a	 collective	 one.	 Thus	 it	 is	 not	 a	 “dis-respect”	 or	 a	“moral	 failure”	 to	 recognize	 rights	 but	 to	 see	 them	 in	 a	 different	economic,	social	and	political	formation;	and	consequently	what	can	be	 controlled	 by	 them:	 music	 and	 stories	 often	 belong	 to	 a	
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community .	 Moreover,	 as	 also	 noted	 above,	 it	 is	 not	 “rational”	 to	6support	a	copyright	system	that	 locally	does	not	deliver	bene@its,	or	respect	 or	 local	 values.	 This	 continues	 to	 be	 a	 fundamental	contradiction	with	the	principles	of	universalist	property	regimes.	
4.	Mechanical	rights	The	 reproduction	 rights	 of	 music	 are	 a	 product	 of	 mass	 popular	music	consumption	and	 the	social	 transformation	of	youth.	 	Million	seller	 records,	 with	 favorites	 that	 change	 by	 the	 week,	 became	 big	business;	it	is	a	very	successful	business	model.	From	a	naive	point	of	view	 the	 model	 of	 selling	 records,	 as	 the	 product,	 seems	 like	 any	other	@ield	of	manufacture;	however,	as	noted	above	this	obscures	the	making	 of	music	 itself.	 Although,	 as	 noted	 above,	 the	 rights	 are	not	simple,	they	echo	the	“rental”	model.	The	fee	we	pay	as	individuals	to	play	 the	 music,	 or	 broadcasters	 to	 do	 so,	 or	 to	 trade	 in	 the	 replay	rights.	Who	“controls”	 the	rights	of	a	piece	of	music	 in	 this	case	are	recognizable.	 The	 point	 to	 note	 here	 is	 that	 by	 using	 digital	 only	transactions	a	number	of	 “middle	men”	are	potentially	 cut	out	 (dis-intermediation)	of	the	equation;	seeming	to	put	the	author	in	control.	As	we	have	noted	above,	this	is	seldom	achieved	in	reality.	
Micro-scale	As	 the	music	 companies	 own	 the	 reproduction	 rights	 they	 can	 “re-exploit”	 their	music	 libraries	 to	 their	heart’s	content	 (as	 long	as	 the	contract	 was	 written	 favorably).	 Consumers	 can	 be	 encouraged	 to	buy	the	same	product	several	times	packaged	in	new	formats:	a	vinyl	record,	a	CD,	and	an	MP3	of	the	same	music.	The	costs	to	the	record	company	 (“pressing”	 the	 CD,	 legal	 and	 management	 costs,	 artist	development,	recording,	promotion,	etc.)	come	to	as	much	as	40%	of	the	sales	cost;	however,	the	actual	costs	are	less	than	half	of	this,	the	remainder	is	the	cost	of	“risk” .	The	50%	retail	and	distribution,	and	7physical	costs	could	all	go	back	to	the	artist,	but	generally	the	music	company,	or	other	agents,	manage	to	retain	a	large	proportion.		This	 is	 the	 sphere	 of	 possibility	 that	 so	 much	 of	 the	 “digitization”	literature	 focuses	 on,	 often	 projecting	 the	 idealized	 case	where	 the	
	See	for	example	the	West	African	Griot	or	storyteller	tradition.Eyre,	B.	(2000).	6In	Griot	Time.	London,	Serpents	Tail.	In	music	the	ratio	of	“misses” to	“hits” is	high,	and	in	any	business	model	this	7has	to	be	accounted	for	in	total	costs.
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artist	sells	direct	to	the	consumer.	This	is	seldom	the	case;	despite	the	fact	 that	 so	many	 routes	 to	market	 are	 possible.	 The	 dominance	 of	platforms	 such	 as	 iTunes,	 and	 Spotify ,	 highlight	 the	 emergence	 of	8digital	 intermediaries	 who,	 as	 ever,	 pass	 a	 small	 proportion	 of	 the	retail	 fee	 to	 the	 artist.	 Added	 to	 which	 is	 the	 completely	 skewed	market	 in	 cultural	 goods,	 of	 which	music	 is	 a	 prime	 example,	 built	upon	a	“winner	takes	all”	model	which	@its	neatly	with	oligopoly	(!!!	INVALID	 CITATION	 !!!	 ).	 The	 music	 industry	 is	 dominated	 by	 just	three	 companies;	 it	 is	 primarily	 these	 companies	 that	 make	 a	 deal	with	the	digital	platforms.	Markets	are	con@igured	and	promoted	by	charts	and	commentary,	the	digital	platforms	(which	con@igure	availability,	and	more	importantly	visibility)	and	accompanying	social	media	operations	to	promote	and	rapidly	 turn	 over	 stars,	 driving	 the	 market	 to	 concentration	 and	monopoly	 pro@its.	 In	 the	 physical	 distribution	 years,	 this	concentration	 was	 vital	 to	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 business	 and	ef@icient	 stock	 control	 and	waste	minimization.	 Today,	 although	 the	physical	necessity	does	not	exist,	 there	continues	 to	be	 institutional	rigidity,	both	 the	 “industry”	and	 the	 “audiences”	are	acculturated	 to	monopoly	 artists.	 The	 new	 digital	 platforms	 are	 in	 a	 win-win	situation,	the	occasional	“slow	burn,”	or	“long	tail”	success	of	the	back	catalogue;	and	the	monopoly	pro@its	from	national,	short	term,	stars.	The	obverse	 is	 that	selling	a	 few	copies	of	anything	will	not	make	a	sustainable	livelihood	for	a	musician.	
Macro-scale	The	industrialization	of	music	–	its	mass	reproduction,	consumption	and	 insertion	 into	 trans-local	 systems	 of	 exchange	 –	 created	 a	 new	realm,	 as	 well	 as	 new	 barriers.	 As	 I	 have	 noted	 music	 needs	 a	“carrier”	the	vinyl	disc,	compact	disc	or	digital	@ile.	Music	traded	in	a	physical	 form	 was	 effectively	 regulated	 after	 the	 fashion	 of	 most	physical	 goods:	 the	 cost	 and	 time	 of	 reproduction,	 and	 (technically	inferior)	 copies,	 were	 a	 barrier	 on	 transgressions.	 Copyright	 issues	were	seen	as	more	or	less	co-existent	with	the	material	object.	Thus,	the	structuring	and	regulatory	factors	were	practiced	through	trade:	the	movement	of	 goods.	Tariff	 barriers	 and	national	borders	had	 to	be	negotiated,	and	taxes	paid.	
	Despite	commercial	differences	these	services	and	those	similar	perform	a	8similar	function	of	distribution	and	licensing	of	the	content.
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With	digitization	it	has	been	often	assumed	that	the	link	between	the	physical	object	 and	 the	musical	work	was	 severed	and	 that	none	of	these	 material	 encumbrances	 would	 apply	 any	 longer.	 Therefore	different	 business	 models	 would	 be	 devised	 to	 capture	 the	 added	value;	again	a	common	proposition	has	been	dis-intermediation:	the	artist	deals	direct	with	the	consumer:	practice	is	somewhat	messier.		The	@irst	aspect	that	we	need	to	appreciate	is	the	role	of	institutional	inheritance,	 or	 path	 dependency.	 The	 path	 to	 market	 of	 music	 has	traditionally	passed	through	a	highly	organized	and	centralized	music	industry.	 It	 was	 organized	 on	 the	 logic	 of	 moving	 goods,	 goods	 for	which	 demand	 @luctuated	 wildly,	 and	 had	 considerably	 diminished	value	after	a	time	period.	As	I	have	noted,	new	digital	platforms	(and	companies)	have	substituted	but	not	replaced	the	distributional	and	marketing	 forms	 established	 in	 an	 analogue	 age.	 It	 would	 be	more	accurate	 to	 say	 a	 re-intermediation	 has	 taken	 place	 around	 digital	platforms.		Even	 in	 the	 analogue	 age	 the	 national	 and	 regional	 differences	 of	music	 marking	 and	 consumption	 were	 often	 overlooked.	 Negus’s	(Negus	1999)	work	offers	a	strong	counter	to	this	normative	view.	He	shows	that	music	markets	are	organized	around	a	number	of	national	territories;	 each	 structured	 around	 particular	 genres,	 release	 dates,	and	 marketing	 campaigns.	 National	 markets	 were,	 and	 are,	differentiated:	 we	 do	 not	 all	 like	 the	 same	 music,	 nor	 produce	 the	same	music.	Music	successful	in	one	territory	was	seldom	successful	in	 another.	 Moreover,	 despite	 the	 emergence	 of	 popular	 music	(dominated	by	a	European-North	American	form),	a	number	of	other	genres	 have	 not	 only	 persisted	 but	 prospered.	 Music	 companies	structured	 their	 activities,	 and	 organized	 their	 markets	 (which	included	 via	 vertical	 and	 horizontal	 integration,	 media	 and	performance,	as	well	as	retail).	The	internationalization	of	the	music	business	 had	 signi@icant	 post-Fordist	 characteristics	 whereby	 niche	markets	were	developed,	and	example	is	the	proliferation	of	“charts”	associated	 with	 genre	 and	 location(Negus	 1999).	 The	 structural	objective	is	volume	and	turnover.	This	 path	 dependency	 matters	 because	 even	 though	 physical	distribution	 of	 music	 has	 declined,	 music	 companies	 (and	 their	replacements,	 the	 digital	 platforms)	 still	 bear	 a	 structural	 legacy	 of	the	genres	and	territories.	The	music	industry	is	still	struggling	with	the	 idea	 of	 the	 @irst	 “global”	 release	 of	 music	 (all	 countries	 at	 the	same	 time).	Despite	 the	 theoretic	 potential,	 the	 reality	 still	 remains	
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one	 of	 national	 systems.	 The	 (once	 physical)	 path,	 and	 market	structure,	 dependency	 is	 also	 one	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	 legal	 one	 too.	International	music	 distributors	will	 not	 operate	 in	 some	 countries	(most	 of	 the	 world),	 not	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 demand,	 but	 because	 they	cannot	 control	 distribution	 and	 copyright.	 These	 countries	 are	literally	“off	 the	 international	map”	of	music;	 they	are	relegated	to	a	secondary	 system	 that	 is	 insulated	 from	 the	 “international”	 system	(see	previous	section).	The	result	 is	 far	from	a	digital	global	free	market	dream;	rather	it	 is	an	 empirical	 story	 of	 a	 combined	 and	 uneven	 music	 industry	development	 of	 (mainly)	 nations	 of	 the	 Global	 South	 (and	 their	signi@icant	musical	heritage).	One	of	the	reasons	that	these	countries	are	 “locked	 out”	 is	 their	 “non-compliance”	 with	 international	copyright	conventions.	In	practice,	most	countries	have	signed	up	to	international	 conventions;	 however,	 the	 problem	 is	 that	 they	 have	insuf@icient	resources	to	police	them,	or	more	critically	to	make	sure	that	the	copyright	industries	function.	
5.	Conclusions	I	 have	 argued	 that	 we	 need	 to	 pay	 closer	 attention	 to	 the	 issue	 of	copyright	with	 respect	 to	music.	Popular	accounts	of	 the	digital	age	and	music	have	rested	on	a	symbolic	erasure	of	production,	and	with	it	 the	 geographies	 of	 production.	 Conceptually	 speaking,	 the	normative	 position	 suffers	 from	 technological	 reductivism,	immaterialism,	 teleology	 and	 universalism.	 The	 answer	 is	 not	 to	simply	offer	a	polar	opposite	point	of	view.	Rather	I	have	argued	for	the	 need	 to	 examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 social	 (legal,	economic	and	political)	and	the	technical	(digital).	The	example	that	has	been	 explored	 in	 this	 chapter	 concerns	one	 such	mediation	 the	@ield	 of	 copyright	 (again	 one	 that	 is	 seldom	 viewed	 as	 a	mediation,	but	as	a	law).		I	 have	 argued	 that	 we	 cannot	 read	 off	 musical	 practices	 from	 a	technological	 map;	 nor	 draw	 a	 direct	 line	 between	 moral	 and	mechanical	 rights;	 and,	 between	 the	 material	 and	 immaterial.	 We	need	to	resist	treating	copyright	as	a	“natural”	thing;	or	as	stable	or	having	 unitary	meaning,	 something	 that	 can	 be	 added	 in	 as	 a	 new	“factor.”	I	have	sought	to	side-step	the	well-travelled	road	of	the	death	of	copyright,	music,	and	geography.	These	are	all	 important	debates,	but	 I	 argued	 that	 they	 miss-construe	 both	 the	 causes	 and	 the	processes	 of	 change.	 Instead,	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 subtle	
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relationship	 of	 making	 and	 remaking	 music	 under	 particular	 local	(legal,	 technical	 and	 artistic)	 conditions	 and	 offers	 a	more	 nuanced	account.	The	 realm	 of	 copyright	 is	 not	 universal	 or	 unitary	 as	 it	 is	 often	presented;	 in	 fact	 it	 is	 local	 and	 fragmented.	Despite	 a	 similar	 legal	coding	 of	 the	 law	 in	 many	 jurisdictions,	 the	 interpretation	 and	practice	of	its	application	is	various;	attenuated	by	the	organizational	capabilities	of	collecting	societies,	audience	and	musicians,	as	well	as	the	state.	These	factors	have	a	direct	relationship	to	the	income	and	legal	 capacity	 of	 regional	 and	 nation	 states.	 Particular	 forms	 are	forged	within	these	historically	and	spatially	situated	conditions.	Accordingly,	 by	 default,	 we	 have	 paid	 too	 much	 attention	 to	 the	consumption	 of	 music,	 passing	 over	 it	 the	 conditions	 of	 its	production.	 The	 debates	 about	 immateriality	 and	mechanical	 rights	had	led	to	a	neglect	of	what	is	in	essence	a	moral	and	cultural	value	debate.	 I	 have	 stressed	 that	 this	 is	 not	 a	 polarized,	 either-or	distinction;	rather	it	is	a	complex	hybrid.	With	 these	 complex	 matrices	 laid	 bare	 we	 can	 observe	 a	 rich	diversity	 of	 music	 practice:	 the	 variety	 of	 different	 ways	 that	 it	 is	possible	to	create	and	disseminate	music.	These	practices	are	the	raw	material	of	the	geographies	of	music,	its	forms	and	performances.	In	this	sense	music	as	a	creative	practice	is	a	product	of	a	locale,	but	not	exclusively:	 not	 simply	 in	 its	 expression,	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 its	organizational	 practices;	 practices	 which	 in	 turn	 shape	 and	 are	shaped	with	a	range	of	institutions	that	can	be	enabling	or	resistant	to	travelling	beyond	the	local.	
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